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PUBLICITY RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND GERMANY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Susanne Bergmann*
I. INTRODUCTION
The advertising industry takes advantage of entertainment and
sport celebrities to enhance the marketability of products and
services. Actors, singers and athletes tell us which drink they prefer,
which pasta they eat and which car they drive in order to influence a
consumer's purchasing decisions. A lucrative market has also
developed for merchandise bearing the names or likenesses of
celebrities. As a result, endorsement fees paid to celebrities continue
to grow and now constitute a significant percentage of their income.
In order to protect the commercial interests of celebrities,
United States courts developed the right of publicity, a concept
originally rooted in the right of privacy.' The right of privacy
focuses on injuries to a person's dignity and state of mind, measured
by mental distress damages. In contrast, the right of publicity
protects the potential commercial value of a person's identity and
grants the individual the right to control the commercial exploitation
of their name, likeness or personality. The right of publicity is
essentially a freely assignable property right and is the basic
framework for endorsement transactions.'
Germany does not recognize a right comparable to the U.S.
right of publicity. However, celebrities may proceed against an
J.D., LL.M. University of Connecticut, Attorney-at-Law, Berlin. Susanne Bergmann
maintains a private practice in Berlin, Germany, as well as holding a position in the legal and
business affairs department of UFA Film-und TV-Produktions GmbH, a division of Europe's
largest entertainment company.
1. Charles Warren and Louis Brandeis first propounded the right of privacy in their article,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), which the New York Court of Appeals
rejected in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1902).
However, in 1903, in reaction to Roberson, the New York legislature enacted a privacy statute
which imposed liability for unauthorized use of a person's name, portrait or picture for
advertising purposes. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).
2. See J. THoMAS MCCARTHY, 2 THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 10.2[A]
(1995) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY].
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unauthorized use of their identity, citing the commercial value at
stake. Statutes provide for the protection of a person's identity, such
as likeness or name.3 Beyond these statutory rights, it has been the
task of the German courts to fill in the gaps and protect other aspects
of a person's identity. On a case-by-case basis, the courts have
developed a "general right of personality" (allgemeines
Personlichkeitsrecht) which is an elaborate system of protection
against defamation and unauthorized exploitation of a person's
commercial value.4  This Article analyzes and compares the
approaches taken by American and German courts to protect the
commercial value of celebrities identities.
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Development of the Law
The right of publicity in the U.S., a relatively recent
development, first appeared in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.5 Haelan involved two rival chewing gum
manufacturers, that both packaged their products with baseball
cards.6 Contracts made with some players assured Haelan that it
would have the exclusive right to use the athletes' photographs and
provided that the players could not grant similar rights to any other
gum manufacturer.7 However, Topps continued to produce baseball
cards and closed contracts with some of the same athletes, despite
their knowledge of the player's contractual obligations to Haelan.8
In the instances where Topps acted alone convincing players to
breach their contractual obligations, Haelan had a valid claim that
Topps had tortuously induced the players to breach their contracts.'
However, Haelan lacked any claim against Topps in instances where
Topps obtained grants through an independent agent or used the
pictures without the players consent.' ° Those players had not granted
Haelan the right to sue on their behalf, and lacked any mental
3. §12 BGB; §§ 22-23 KUG.
4. See discussion infra Part III.A
5. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
6. Id. at 867.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 869.
10. Id.
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distress, a prerequisite for a valid claim under right of privacy." In
order to grant Haelan relief, the court recognized that, "in addition to
and independent of that right of privacy ... a [person] has a right [to]
the publicity value of [their] photograph, i.e., the right to grant the
exclusive privilege of publishing his picture .... This right might be
called a 'right of publicity."'' 2 This gave Haelan, as the holder of an
exclusive grant of the right to use certain players' images, a valid
claim against Topps.13
At its outset, the right of publicity received skepticism 4 and
courts were reluctant to apply it.'5 In the 1970's, case law began to
recognize a distinction between the right of privacy and the right of
publicity.'6 In 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting. Co.'7 gave the right of publicity
national recognition. Zacchini, a circus artist, performed as a
"human cannon ball."' 8 A local broadcasting company videotaped
his performance and broadcasted the entire fifteen second
performance as part of its evening news program without Zacchini's
consent. 9 The Court recognized that because the program broadcast
Zacchini's entire act, it posed "a substantial threat-to the economic
value of his performance,"2 and, therefore, violated his right of
publicity.2
Courts and scholars alike have cited several reasons for
recognizing the right of publicity. First, the right of publicity aims to
secure the economic value of an individual's identity and prevent
11. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 869.
12. Id. at 868.
13. Id. at 869.
14. See Strickler v. National Broad. Co., 167 F. Supp. 68, 70 (S.D. Cal. 1958). But see
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954); William
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 393, 389 (1960). Prosser divided the tort of invasion of
privacy into four categories: (1) intrusion upon plaintiff's physical solitude or into his private
affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation, for the defendant's
advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness. Id.
15. See I MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, § 1.9[A].
16. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824-25 (9th Cir.
1974); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1280-81 (D. Minn. 1970).
17. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
18. Id. at 562.
19. Id.
20. The court did not accept the First Amendment defense on the grounds that this privilege
did not encompass the right to broadcast the performer's entire act without his consent. Id. at
574-75; see infra Part 1I.C.2.
21. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
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unjust enrichment to the infringer.' These authorities contend that
celebrities invest considerable money, time, and energy into
developing the ability to attract attention and "evoke a desired
response in a particular consumer market."' 3 Therefore, they should
"reap the reward of [their] endeavors."'24 Second, the right of
publicity protects against the dilution of celebrities' commercial
value through excessive unauthorized uses.' Furthermore, as the
Court in Zacchini noted, protection "provides an economic
incentive"'26 for performers to produce entertaining and intellectual
works, which is "analogous to the goals of patent and copyright
law."27
The right of publicity is now considered an independent
doctrine which is distinct from the right of privacy.28 It has been
recognized in twenty-five states, either by statute or common law.29
Although the basic concept of the right of publicity is clear, each
state has its own criteria for establishing a claim. For example,
criteria concerning which aspects of a person's identity are
protectable,30 whether the right is descendible or which remedies are
available vary among states.3
B. Protected Aspects of a Person's Identity
1. Likeness and Picture
The commercial use of a person's identity can be embodied in a
photograph,32 drawing,33 or film. In order to find an appropriation,
the person must be identifiable in the depiction.' The issue of
22. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983).
23. See Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); see also
Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. 1282 ; Nimmer, supra note 14, at 230.
24. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573.
25. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Wis. 1979).
26. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
27. Id; see Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1358 n.18 (D.N.J. 1983).
28. See 1 MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, § 6.1 [B].
29. Id.
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (1995).
31. 2 McCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, § 6.3[A].
32. According to a California statute, "photograph" means as any "photograph or
photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any videotape or live television transmission, of
any person, such that the person is readily identifiable." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(b) (West 1997).
33. See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
34. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(bXl) (West 1997). "A person shall be deemed to be
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identification was discussed in Ali v. Playgirl, Inc." There, Playgirl
Magazine depicted a nude black man seated in the comer of a boxing
ring.36 The depiction was not an actual photo, but "an illustration
falling somewhere between representational art and cartoon . . .,,"
The court found that even after a cursory inspection of the picture,
the figure was identifiable as Muhammad Ali.3
Identification was more difficult to determine in Cohen v.
Herbal Concepts, Inc.,39 the "Nude Back" case which involved an
advertisement for an anti-cellulite product. The advertisement in
Cohen depicted two nude women, shown only from behind.4
Although their faces were not visible, the plaintiff's husband
recognized the women as his wife and daughter.4' The defendants
contended that the husband only recognized his wife and daughter
because he was present when the picture was taken.42 The New York
Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that a person could be
identified without facial features being shown.43 The court stated,
"[t]he identifying features of the subjects include their hair, bone
structure, body contours and stature and their posture," enough that
"someone familiar with the persons in the photograph could identify
them by looking at the advertisement.S
Another issue concerning identification is whether the use of a
look-alike in an advertisement falls within the scope of protection of
the right of publicity. In Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc.,'
the defendant published an ad featuring a photograph of an
imaginary wedding.47 The photograph depicted several celebrities
readily identifiable from a photograph when one who views the photograph with the naked eye
can reasonably determine that the person depicted in the photograph is the same person who is
complaining of its unauthorized use." Id
35. See All, 447 F. Supp. at 723.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 727.
38. Id. at 726.
39. 482 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1984).
40. Id. at 458.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 460.
43. See 1 MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, § 4.12[B].
44. Cohen, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
45. Id.
46. 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) qJ'd without opinion, 488 N.Y.S.2d 934 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1985).
47. Id. at 257.
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and a woman who bore a striking resemblance to Jacqueline
Kennedy Onassis.4  Dior argued that the advertisement was
protected because they had not used a photograph of Jackie
Onassis.49 The New York Supreme Court rejected this argument and
issued an injunction against the use of the ad. The court held:
A photograph may be a depiction only of the person before the
lens, but a "portrait or picture" gives wider scope, to encompass
a representation which conveys the essence and likeness of an
individual, not only [in] actuality, but the close and purposeful
resemblance to reality .... No one is free to trade on another's
name or appearance and claim immunity because what he is
using is similar to but not identical with the original. 50
Accordingly, "[w]hen... the look-alike seems indistinguishable
from the real person and the context of the advertisement clearly
implies that he or she is the real celebrity," "the look-alike's
depiction can be considered a picture or portrait of the celebrity. 52
Thus, an infringement of the right of publicity will apply to the use
of look-alikes or celebrity impersonators.53
2. Name and Nickname
A person's name is protected by the right of publicity.'
Imagine the following advertisement, "Michael Jackson might be a
great singer, but he has never tried Coca Cola! Why don't you?" If
Michael Jackson had never consented to the use of his name, he
would be entitled to protection. Because the hypothetical
advertisement does not imply any endorsement by the singer, a claim
for false endorsement under section 43(a) of the Federal Lanham Act
would fail.5 5 However, the use of Jackson's name is an infringement
of his right of publicity.
48. Id. at 256-57.
49. Id. at 260.
50. Id. at 261.
51. Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
52. Id.; see Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1349 (D.N.J. 1981) (finding that "a
reasonable viewer upon seeing the pictures alone would likely believe the individual portrayed to
be Elvis Presley.").
53. Id.
54. Uhlaender v. Henrickson, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1280-81 (D. Minn. 1970).
55. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
28:14, 28-17 (1995) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS]. "[T]he premiere federal vehicle
for private assertion of rights against false advertising is § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which is an
appropriate vehicle for the assertion of private claims against false endorsement by the
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Similar to likenesses and pictures, the identification of a person
is also critical when their name is used. If a person is known or
easily recognizable by his or her first name, the use of this name may
be sufficient to be an appropriation. Some examples of celebrity
names include Cher, 6 and "John, Paul, George and Ringo.""7  In
addition, the same right of publicity protection also applies to
nicknames.58
A difficult question of identification was raised in Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.59 In Carson, the defendant had
used the name "Here's Johnny" for a portable toilet service, and the
court examined whether this slogan was sufficient enough to identify
the plaintiff.' The court of appeals found a violation of Carson's
right of publicity although his complete name or picture had not been
appropriated.6' However, the court noted that there would not have
been a violation of Carson's right of publicity if the defendant had
used Carson's full name in its advertisement. 62  Because Carson
derived his celebrity identity from the phrase "Here's Johnny," the
defendant's use of Carson's full name, John William Carson, would
have not misappropriated Carson's identity as a celebrity.63
3. Voice
Historically, courts were reluctant to grant right of publicity
protection in cases regarding sound-alikes. 4 But, in Midler v. Ford
unpermitted use of the persona of a person." Id.
56. Cher v. Forum Int'l Ltd., 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982).
57. Apple Corps Ltd. v. Adirondack Group, 476 N.Y.2d 716, 718-19 (1983). "Four persons
named 'John, Paul, George and Ringo' will not be taken by the public as a reference to the
Moskowitz Brothers, to the Pope and two other people, or to anyone else except the members of
the best known singing group in the world." Id.
58. Hirsch v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979). In Hirsch, the
plaintiff Elroy Hirsch, a former football star, was known by his nickname "Crazylegs." Id. The
defendant marketed their shaving gel for women under this name. The court held that the fact
that the name "Crazylegs" was a nickname rather than "Hirsch's actual name does not preclude a
cause of action. All that is required is that the name clearly identifies the wronged person." Id. at
137.
59. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
60. Id. The defendant used the phrase "Here's Johnny" to associate their product with the
plaintifX Johnny Carson. Id. at 837.
61. Id. at 836.
62. Id. at 837.
63. Id.
64. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970) (refusing to
grant protection to the plaintiff because he did not own the copyright to the song used in the
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Motor Co.,6 the Ninth Circuit changed the judicial attitude toward
such imitations through their interpretation of the existing California
statute.' In Midler, Ford Motor Company wanted to run an
advertisement using Midler's hit song, "Do You Want to Dance.,
67
When Midler rejected the offer to sing in the commercial, the
advertising agency hired a former backup vocalist of Midler's and
instructed her to "sound as much as possible like [] Bette Midler
.... ,68 Ford Motor Company, like the defendants in Onassis, argued
that it was in compliance with California Civil Code section 3344,
because it had not used Midler's name, voice, signature, photograph
or likeness in its advertisement.69 While the court agreed, it held that
the statute did not preclude Midler from pursuing a common law
right of publicity cause of action.7' The court held Ford liable for a
common law violation emphasizing that,7' "A voice is as distinctive
and personal as a face .... To impersonate her voice is to pirate her
identity."72
Shortly after the Midler ruling, Frito-Lay commenced an
advertisement campaign using a jingle inspired by Tom Waits's song
"Step Right Up."73  The advertising agency that produced the
advertisement was aware that Waits refused to appear in any kind of
advertisement, and therefore did not even ask Waits for his consent.74
Instead, the advertising agency searched for a singer who could
imitate his distinctive voice.75 Waits sued Frito-Lay and the
advertising agency alleging a misappropriation claim under
California law and a false endorsement claim under the Lanham
Act.76 The Ninth Circuit, relying on Midler, found that Frito-Lay
misappropriated Waits's voice.'
defendant's advertisement); see also Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (limiting "a performer's right of protection against imitators.").
65. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
66. CAL CIV. CODE § 990 (West 1997); CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West 1997).
67. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461-62.
68. Id. at 461.
69. Id. at 463.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 463.
72. Id.
73. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d. 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1097-98.
76. Id at 1093.
77. Id. at 1098.
1999] PUBLICITY RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN GERMANY 487
4. Identifying Objects
Like a picture, name, or voice, a physical object can be a means
of identification. In Motschenbacher v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., '
the court found that when an object is so closely related to a person
that their persona can be identified by mere reference to that object, a
right of publicity violation has occurred.' In that case,
Motschenbacher, a famous race car driver, successfully sued for the
unauthorized use of a picture of his distinctive race car. Although
Motschenbacher was unrecognizable in the photograph, the court
pointed out that even though some minor stylistic changes were
made, the markings were unique to the plaintiff's car, causing some
persons to think the car in question was plaintiff's."0
A decision widely criticized as "overextending" the right of
publicity81 was White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.82 In
White, the defendants created an advertisement parodying the
popular game show Wheel of Fortune.3 The advertisement depicted
a robot dressed in a gown, wig, and jewelry which was intended to
imitate the game show's hostess, Vanna White." The set for the
advertisement was immediately recognizable as that of Wheel of
Fortune. White sued Samsung for both infringement of her
California statutory and common law right of publicity and false
endorsement under the Lanham Act.8" The defendants argued that
the ad was a spoof of Wheel of Fortune.6 The court denied the
plaintiff's claim for infringement of California Civil Code section
3344 because the robot could not be considered a likeness within the
meaning of this provision.8" However, the court held that Samsung
78. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
79. Id. at 827.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Gretchen A. Pemberton, The Parodist's Claim to Fame: A Parody Exception
to the Right of Publicity, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 97, 107 (1993); Steven C. Clay, Starstruck: The
Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REV. 485
(1994); William M. Heberer III, The Overprotection of Celebrity: A Comment on White v.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729, 748 (1994). But see 2
MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, at app. A.
82. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
83. Id. at 1396.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. For the parody defense, see infra discussion Part II.C.1.
87. White, 971 F.2d at 1397.
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had violated White's common law right of publicity.88 The court
pointed out that appropriations of identity do not have to be
accomplished by particular means:
It is not important how the defendant has appropriated the
plaintiff's identity, but whether the defendant has done so ....
A rule which says that the right of publicity can be infringed
only through the use of nine different methods of appropriating
identity merely challenges the clever advertising strategist to
come up with the tenth.89
Thus, the court stated that taken as a whole, the advertisement left
little doubt that Samsung meant to depict Vanna White.r
C. Defenses
1. Consent
The holder of the right of publicity may consent to the
commercial use of their identity.9' Conduct is not actionable so long
as it falls within the boundaries of the consent.' A formal
agreement, such as an assignment or license may grant consent.93 In
addition, consent may be implied from conduct in states not
requiring written consent.' Consent may be limited to certain
products or media, by duration, or to a specific geographic ar, a.9'
Consent to be photographed, however, does not automatically
imply consent to commercial use.' For example, when a photo-
journalist takes a picture of a person involved in a public event,
implied consent may apply when the picture is used to illustrate the
newsworthy event, but not when it is used in an advertisement.9
88. Id. at 1397-99.
89. Id. at 1398.
90. See id. at 1399.
91. Id.
92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. f(1995).
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Id. § 46 cmt. g.
96. See, e.g., Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., Inc., 757 F.2d 440, 446 (lst Cir.
1985); Ali v. PlaygirL Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citing Gautier v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485,488 (N.Y. 1952)).
97. See 2 MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, § 10.7[A].
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2. First Amendment and Newsworthiness
The right of publicity is restricted in the interests of both
freedom of expression and freedom of the press. In balancing
between these interests, an unauthorized use will fall within one of
two categories."8 A "communicative" use is one in which the golicy
of free speech outweighs an individual's right of publicity. In
contrast, a "commercial" use is an infringement of an individual's
right of publicity because the commercial aspects of the use
outweigh the interests of free speech."' Under the First Amendment,
media coverage of newsworthy events and matters of public interest
is "communicative." The medium used will often determine whether
an unauthorized use is "communicative" or "commercial.""'' For
example, if the likeness is printed on a T-shirt or a coffee mug, the
use is considered "commercial" and is not entitled to First
Amendment protection. Conversely, if the same likeness is
published in the media to illustrate a newsworthy event, the use is
considered communicative and remains constitutionally protected."'°
In Zacchini v. Scripps,"'3 the issue before the U.S. Supreme
Court was whether broadcasting an artist's entire performance could
still be considered news. The Court protected the performer's right
of publicity holding that Scripps's exhibition of the entire act
exceeded the boundaries of news coverage."'
In Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc.,"'' the San Jose
Mercury News published a special section in the newspaper about the
San Francisco 49ers' 1990 Super Bowl victory."'6 The special
section in the newspaper was entirely devoted to the team."'° This
section included an artistic depiction of Montana.' 8 Each of the
98. 4 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 55, § 28:41.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id
102. Marya Lenn Yee & Douglas L. Pelman, Posters Win Free.Press Protections, NAT'L
L.J., July 31, 1995, at B7. For further examples, see Horst-Peter Gtting, From the Right of
Privacy to the Right of Publicity, GRUR INT., 656, 663 (1996); BRUNo SEEMANN, PROMINENZ
ALS EIGENTUM 113 et seq. (1996).
103. 433 U.S. 562 (1977); see discussion supra Part II.A.
104. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574-575 (stating that "Mhe First and Fourteenth Amendments
do not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent.").
105. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
106. Id. at 641.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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newspaper pages was reproduced in poster form and was either sold
to the general public or given away at charitable events.109 Montana
brought an action against the newspaper, claiming that the
reproduction and sale of the posters constituted common law and
statutory commercial misappropriation of his name, photograph, and
likeness." 0
Clearly, the newspaper's publication regarding the Super Bowl
was a newsworthy event and was, therefore, entitled to First
Amendment protection. But, the crucial issue in the case was
whether the reproduction of the picture in poster form was
permissible. The court found that the posters enjoyed the same
protection as the original newspaper publication of the picture."'
The court stated that the reason Montana's name and likeness
appeared on the posters was for precisely the same reason they
appeared on the front page of the original newspaper story, "because
Montana was a major player in contemporaneous newsworthy sports
event[s]. ' 12
However, the court did not extend blanket protection to all
commemorative posters."' The court focused mainly on the content
of the poster and took several factors into consideration: the
defendant was a newspaper and not a poster company; the posters
were sold at cost or given away; the poster depicted game action and
was not a mere portrait of the athlete; and the publication occurred
shortly after the event, and was intended to celebrate the event rather
than the athlete." 4 Moreover, the court rejected Montana's claims
because a newspaper can promote itself through its news stories
without violating an individual's right of publicity, as long as the
advertising does not create the impression that the person depicted
endorses the news medium. '
3. First Amendment and Parody
The First Amendment generally protects parody." 6 Under
copyright law, parody is a permissive fair use of the original work as
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 641.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Yee & Perlman, supra note 102, at B9.
115. Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 642.
116. See 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 55, § 31:153.
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long as it meets the requirements set forth in section 107 of the
Copyright Act of 1976."' However, trademark law protects a parody
only when there is no likelihood of consumer confusion."8 It
remains unclear whether a parody defense exists when a claim is
made under right of publicity.
In Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc.,"9 the New York
Supreme Court recognized the parody defense for a right of publicity
claim. In 1968, Pat Paulsen, a well-known comedian, incorporated
his presidential candidacy into a comedy routine.12 His candidacy
was the subject of comment by different news media.' Paulsen
licensed a company to sell his campaign buttons, stickers, and
posters." Without Paulsen's consent the defendants sold a mock-
presidential campaign poster bearing Paulsen's likeness."z The
Court denied Paulsen's motion for a preliminary injunction, holding
that, "it is sufficiently relevant to a matter of public interest to be a
form of expression which is constitutionally protected and 'deserving
of substantial freedom.""2
In contrast, the White court questioned the existence of a parody
defense.'" The court rejected Samsung's defense that the
advertisement was only a "spoof' and held that as commercial
speech, the ad did not enjoy the same First Amendment protection."
The court distinguished this ad from the ad in Hustler Magazine v.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). This provision allows fair use of a copyrighted work for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. It lists
four factors for courts to weigh in determining whether a fair use exists:
(1) the purpose and the character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
Id.
118. See Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1227-28 (7th Cir. 1993);
Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1314, 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Mutual of
Omaha Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D. Neb. 1986), afl' 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987);
see also 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 55, § 31:153.
119. 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
120. Id. at 504.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 508.
125. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992).
126. Id.
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Falwell.'" The ad in Hustler involved a fictitious interview with
Reverend Jerry Falwell, president of the organization "Moral
Majority," about his "first time." '128 The Court noted that Hustler's
parody of Falwell was made for the purpose of poking fun at him
whereas the "spoof' of Vanna White and Wheel of Fortune was
"subservient and only tangentially related to the ad's primary
message [to] 'buy Samsung VCRs.'""29
The White decision has been widely criticized. 30 The decision
has raised serious doubts as to whether the underlying rationales of
the right of publicity justify the protection of Vanna White's image.
The overriding rationale of intellectual property protection is to have
the public-at-large benefit from the availability of creative works.
This goal is important when deciding whether a celebrity's image
should be protected. Judge Kozinski dissented in White and
questioned the consequences of an expansive right of publicity;
"[w]here would we be if every author and celebrity had been given
the right to keep people from mocking them or their work? Surely,
this would have made the world poorer, not richer, culturally as well
as economically.""'3
Another underlying rationale for granting celebrities protection
through the right of publicity is to prevent unjust enrichment of the
appropriator.12  However, in the case of parodies, this argument is
contestable. Like any other artist, entertainer, or movie star, a
parodist has invested time and labor to create a good parody. Any
profit the parodist makes is earned.' This argument hardly justifies
the result in White. Vanna White's sole contribution to the game
127. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Hustler featured a "parody" of an advertisement for Campari
Liqueur entitled "Jerry Falwell talks about his 'first time.'" Id. at 48. Campari's ads included
interviews with several celebrities about their "first time," meaning the first time they sampled
Campari. Id. Hustler Magazine copied the layout of these ads and drafted an "interview" with
Falwell in which he states that his "first time" was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with
his mother in an outhouse. Id. Falwell sued for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 47-48. The U.S. Supreme Court granted First Amendment
protection "to speech that is patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury when
that speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public
figure involved." Id. at 50.
128. Id. at 48.
129. White, 971 F.2d at 1401.
130. See Pemberton, supra note 81, at 107; Clay, supra note 81, at 486; Heberer, supra note
81, at 748.
131. White, 989 F.2d at 1516 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
132. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983);
see also discussion supra Part I.A.
133. See Pemberton, supra note 81, at 107.
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show was as the hostess, she did not create the game show. She was
only one part of Samsung's imitation."3 Samsung exploited the
popularity of Wheel of Fortune, not Vanna White, and was thus not
unjustly enriched through the use of her identity.13
5
In copyright law, when analyzing the applicability of the fair
use defense, courts examine whether the parody takes the place of
the original; usually, the audience viewing a parody does not have an
interest in the original, thus the parody and the original serve
different market demand. 3  Therefore, a parody will not affect the
market for the original in any significant way and is neither intended
nor does it have the effect of replacing the demand for the original. 1
37
In fact, the parody may even enhance the celebrity's publicity
value. 38 As long as the parody is clearly recognizable as such, it will
not be a copyright infringement.
39
In White, no consumer would have confused the robot for
Vanna White, or assumed that Vanna White endorsed the product.
Furthermore, Samsung had no interest in using Vanna White in its
commercial. The commercial's humor lay entirely in the fact that the
hostess portrayed was a robot. Therefore, Vanna White did not lose
any opportunity to use her identity commercially. In a case such as
this, the interests of the parodist should prevail. In fact, the essence
of a parody is imitation. A parody without imitating the original is
not possible. Thus, a conflict between the interests of a celebrity and
the parodist is inevitable.
D. Transferability of the Right of Publicity
Whereas the right of privacy is considered a personal right,"4° it
is uniformly recognized that the right of publicity is a property
right. 4' The property nature of the right of publicity is significant in
134. Id.
135. Id. at 107.
136. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U. S. 569, 591 (1994).
137. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964).
138. 2 MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, § 8.15[B].
139. 1 MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, § 1.9.
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 cmt. a (1977); Robert C. Post,
Rereading Warren andBrandes: Privacy, Property andAppropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L.REv.
647, 663 (1991).
141. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988); Acme Circus
Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1983); Uhlaender v. Henricksen,
316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282-83 (D. Minn. 1970); Presley v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tenn. App.
1987); see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(b) (West 1997) (stating that, "The rights recognized under
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several contexts, including its transferability. The right of publicity
may be legally separated from the person 42 and a transfer is possible
either by assignment or license. 143
An assignment of the right of publicity conveys ownership to
the assignee. The assignor is bound to the assignment and is
prohibited from exploiting these rights if the exploitation conflicts
with the terms of the assignment. As discussed above, an assignment
is a consent to commercial use of a person's identity. As owner of
the right, the assignee has standing to assert the right against
others. "
In contrast, a license is limited permission to use the right
without transfer of any ownership. 45 The parties may limit the
license to specific aspects of identity, length of the license, use,
territory or product line." There are two forms of licenses which
must be distinguished: an exclusive license and a non-exclusive
license. The licenses carry significantly different legal implications.
A license is exclusive when the licensor explicitly promises not to
grant further licenses within the scope of the exclusivity. The
licensor may grant several exclusive licenses, if they are limited in
scope and do not conflict with one another.47 Non-exclusive
licenses do not contain any promise preventing the licensor from
licensing similar rights to other parties.'"
A licensee does not acquire ownership of the commercial value
of the identity, and therefore generally does not have standing to
object to uses by third persons." Only when an exclusive license
has been granted can a licensee prevent uses that infringe on the
scope of their exclusive right." This view has prevailed since the
this section are property rights, freely transferable, in whole or in part, by contract or by means of
trust or testamentary documents.. "); 2 MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, § 10.2[A];
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. g (1995).
142. See Post, supra note 140, at 669.
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. g (1995).
144. Id
145. Id.
146. Use outside the scope constitutes an infringement of the right of publicity but not a
breach of contract. Id. § 46 cmts. a-b.
147. See 2 MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, § 10.13.
148. Id.
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETIrION § 96 cmt. g (1995).
150. See 2 MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, § 10.13; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. g (1995). The licensor has the option to retain the exclusive
right to sue for infringements and to undertake the corresponding duty to monitor the market and
1999] PUBLICITY RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN GERMANY 495
first appearance of the right of publicity in Haelan."' The baseball
players had not granted Haelan any right to sue on their behalf."5 2
Therefore, Haelan lacked standing to assert their rights.' The court
circumvented this problem by holding that the "plaintiff, in its
capacity as the exclusive grantee of a player's 'right of publicity,'
has a valid claim against the defendant. .. ."" Subsequent
decisions have never questioned this position and have recognized
the exclusive licensee's standing to bring a claim.'
E. Descendibility of the Right of Publicity
In the U.S., interests protected by the right of privacy, such as
dignity, reputation, or emotions, terminate upon death; traditionally,
the right of privacy is a personal right, and heirs cannot sue for a post
mortem invasion of the privacy of a deceased person. 6 The right of
publicity, however, is a property right that protects the commercial
value of a person's identity. ? 7 Therefore, the rationale for limiting
right of privacy to living persons does not apply in the right of
publicity cases. Yet, the question whether the right of publicity dies
with the person or passes to the descendants or assignees is the
sue infringers if necessary. Id.
151. Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
152. See id. at 869.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1199-1200 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). There the court held:
Unlike privacy rights, which protect personality and feelings and are therefore not
assignable, the right of publicity gives rise to a "proprietary" interest in the
commercial value of one's persona which is assignable and may be freely licensed.
This proprietary interest is much like a copyright, it embodies a bundle of exclusive
marketing rights which its holder may transfer in its entirety by an assignment or in
part by exclusive licenses. Holders of exclusive licenses gain standing to protect
their interests against all who would encroach on the exclusive rights embodied in
the licenses.
Id; see Bi-Rite Enters. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1985); Factors Etc., Inc. v.
Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), a'd. sub nom., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1978); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Creative Screen Design, Ltd., 214 U.S.P.Q. 188, 190 (N.D.
III. 1981).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 cmt. b (1977); Young v. That Was the
Week That Was, 423 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1970); Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983); James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 344 P.2d 799, 800-01 (Cal. Ct. App, 1959).
157. See discussion supra Part U.B.
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subject of numerous academic commentaries.. and has often been
litigated.159
The court in Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,6° first considered
the issue of descendibility when the widows of Laurel and Hardy
alleged that Hal Roach Studios wrongfully licensed "exclusive
merchandising rights" to the names and likenesses of the two
renowned comedians. The court ruled in favor of the widows and
held that the New York common law right of publicity continued
post mortem. '61 The court emphasized the difference in the nature of
the right of privacy and the right of publicity. Taking into account
the purely commercial nature of the right of publicity the court held
that there was "no logical reason to terminate this right upon death of
the person protected."162
At the same time, a similar claim arose by the heirs of Bela
Lugosi. 63 He was the most famous of the many actors who played
Count Dracula.' 4 Universal Pictures signed a contract with Lugosi
which gave them the right to exploit Lugosi's name and likeness in
connection with the movie. Universal however licensed the image of
Lugosi for use on merchandising products which had almost no
relationship to the film itself. 165 Lugosi's heirs claimed that
Universal's licensing exceeded the scope of the contract. The court
158. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, Elvis is Alive, But He Shouldn't Be: The Right of Publicity
Revisited, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 597 (1992); Andrew B. Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability
Reconsidered, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (1981); Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The
Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J.
1125 (1980); Ben C. Adams, Inheritability of the Right of Publicity upon the Death of the
Famous, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1251 (1980).
159. See, e.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d
697 (Ga. 1982); State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Mem'l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 697, 704
(Ga. 1982); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979). The question of the
descendibility of the right of publicity should not be confused with the question of survivability of
the cause of action where the invasion of the person's right happened during the person's lifetime.
See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Texas 1980).
There plaintiff, Heloise, died during the law suit. Id. at 535-36. The discussion about the post
mortem right of publicity is centered around the instance when the invasion happens after the
person's death. See 2 MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, § 92 [A].
160. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
161. See id. at 847.
162. Id. at 844.
163. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979) (per curium).
164. Id. at 427.
165. Id.
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denied the heirs' claim because Lugosi himself had not exploited his
image as Dracula during his lifetime."
The requirement of lifetime exploitation was explicitly rejected
in Martin Luther King, Jr. Center. for Social Change, Inc. v.
American Heritage Products., Inc.'67 The case involved the
unauthorized sale of plastic busts of the deceased civil rights
leader.'68 In King, the court recognized the descendibility of the right
of publicity. 69 It argued that the economic value of the right may
increase during life by securing the expectations of potential
licensees and assignees.' Regarding the lifetime exploitation
requirement, the court observed, "a person who avoids exploitation
during life is entitled to have his image protected against exploitation
after death as much if not more than a person who exploited his
image during life."'71
The majority of the states currently accept that the right of
publicity is descendible property." Ten states recognize a post
mortem right by statute and four by common law." None of the
statutes recognizing the post mortem right of publicity require prior
lifetime exploitation." Courts are also abandoning this
requirement. 75 However, statutes, that recognize descendibility,
typically limit the duration of the right to a fixed term of years. 76
This varies from twenty to 100 years in most states.'" It is argued
that a limitation of the duration would serve the interest of the
general public because at some point, "the person's identity should
166. See Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979). In 1985,
California enacted a statutory post mortem right which rejects this lifetime exploitation
requirement. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(h) (West 1997). This provision was designed to legislatively
overrule the Lugosi decision.
167. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods. Inc.,
296 S.E.2d 697, 706 (Ga. 1982).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 705.
171. Id. at 706.
172. See 2 MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, § 9.5[B].
173. 2 MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, § 9.5[A].
174. 2 MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, § 9.5 (surveying post mortem right to
publicity in the U.S.).
175. Id.
176. Except for Nebraska, where no duration is defined. See NEBR. REV. STAT. § 20-208
(Michie 1993).
177. See 2 MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 2, § 9.5.
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enter the public domain as part of history and folklore."'' TS A
limitation also helps establish commercial predictability and
certainty. 79 Assignees and licensees will know how long they can
exploit a right. Additionally, they will be able to calculate the exact
value in order to avoid unnecessary litigation.
F. Remedies
In the case of a continuing or possible infringement of the right
of publicity, the court may grant injunctive relief.80 A permanent
injunction prevents the defendant from unauthorized use of the
plaintiff's identity in advertising or merchandising activities. When
consent is limited the injunction prevents uses from exceeding the
scope of the consent.' While trial is pending a court may issue a
preliminary injunction. In deciding whether to grant a permanent
injunction, courts will consider the following: 1) the likelihood that
the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm, 2) the likelihood of the
plaintiffs success on the merits, 3) the balance of equities between
the parties, and 4) the interests of society.
8 2
A plaintiff may also seek monetary relief in the form of
compensatory damages which are measured by the economic loss.
8 3
If the celebrity has actively exploited their identity, the infringement
may result in a direct loss of profits from sales or licenses. ' 4
Furthermore, unauthorized use can damage a celebrity's image by
over exposure or by association with undesirable goods or
services.'85 The damage may result in a depreciation of the identity's
178. 2 MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note2, § 9.4.
179. Id.
180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4.8 (1995).
181. See, e.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (D. Minn. 1970); Brinkley v. Casablancas,
438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1014 (N.Y. 1981); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETTON § 48 cmt. d (1995); see e.g., Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444
F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aft'4 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New
York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), affd without opinion, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
183. Some states state a minimum damage recoverable when greater loss is not proven. See
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 990, 3344(a) (West 1997) (minimum damage of $750); NEv. REv. STAT. §
597.810 l(bXl) (Michie 1994) (minimum damage of $750); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.013
(aX1) (West 1999) ($2,500 for an infringement of the post mortem right of publicity).
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. d (1995).
185. Id. § 49 cmt a.
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commercial value and goodwill or may lead to a reduction of future
economic opportunities.' In Clark v. Celeb Publishing, Inc.,8 7 a
model/actress sought monetary relief for the unauthorized
publication of her picture in a low quality pornographic magazine."'
She claimed that other magazines, such as Penthouse, would not
want to hire her in the future because of her association with a
magazine of such low quality and prestige. The court awarded Clark
$7,000 in compensatory damages for her projected economic loss. 9
A celebrity may also claim restitution for the unjust gain to thedefendant. 9"
Courts have had difficulty in assessing damages, especially
when determining the exact loss suffered by the plaintiff, or the gain
achieved by the defendant. Courts have various means of
determining value and take several factors into account including the
fame of the celebrity, the amount the plaintiff has received on earlier
occasions for similar uses, 9' and expert testimony concerning the
licensing fees paid for comparable uses to similarly situated persons.
The courts in Waits,"9 and Midler,'93 found the fair market value of
the unauthorized use to be $100,000 and $400,000 respectively. In
an extraordinary case, the fair market value of a license has reached
upwards of $5.5 million."
In cases where the unauthorized use of the identity has been
defamatory or places the celebrity in a false light, the infringement
may also cause emotional distress, humiliation or reputational
injuries. 95 These damages are governed by an invasion of privacy
186. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 978 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1992); Clark v. Celeb
Publ'g, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 979, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280
N.W.2d 129, 138 (Wis. 1979).
187. 530 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 984.
190. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1449(A)
(West 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. 47-25-1106(d); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.013(aX2) ('West
1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895(lXb) (West 1997).
191. Clark, 530 F. Supp. at 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Welch v. Mr. Christmas, Inc., 454
N.Y.S.2d 971,973 (N.Y. 1982) (measured by fee under an earlier contract between the parties for
an ad running in the previous Christmas season); Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314
(Pa.C.P. 1957).
192. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1992).
193. See Midler v. Young & Republican, Inc., Nos. 90-55027, 90-55028, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22641 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 1991).
194. Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q. 1015, 1016 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986).
195. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETTION § 49 cmts. ab (1995).
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and may coexist with the liability for infringement of the right of
publicity."
In addition to compensatory damages, punitive damages are
available under general tort principles." However, some statutes
which recognize the right of publicity authorize the award of punitive
damages only when the defendant knowingly infringes on the
plaintiff's right of publicity. 98 Punitive damages can be extremely
high, as exemplified in Waits, where the court awarded $2 million."
The Waits court determined that the advertiser and its agency were
fully aware of the commercial imitation of Waits's voice.2" The
defendants were aware that voice imitation was actionable in
California because Midler had been decided only three months
earlier.2°' Therefore, the defendants should have known that
unauthorized voice imitation was actionable in California. 2
The Defendants knowingly took a calculated risk, thereby
"act[ing] in conscious disregard of rights recognized in
California."2 3
III. THE CONCEPT OF THE "GENERAL RIGHT OF PERSONALITY"
Part II reveals that the right of publicity in the U.S. has developed into
a property right separate from the right of privacy. The American right of
publicity affords an individual comprehensive protection against
unauthorized exploitation of the commercial value of their identity. While
an individual in Germany enjoys protection against unauthorized uses of
their identity, no distinct right of publicity exists that is comparable to that
in the U.S. In Germany, a person's commercial interests are protected by a
much broader right, a general right of personality, that has been developed
by statute and by the courts.2°4
196. Id. § 49 cmt. b (1995).
197. See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1105.
198. See, e.g., Welch, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 971, 975 (stating that there is no need to establish
malice or recklessness); see NEv. REv. STAT. ANm. § 597.810 l(bX2) (Michie 1994).
199. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1104.
200. Id. at 1104-05.
201. Id. at 1104.
202. Id. at 1105.
203. Id.
204. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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A. Development
Originally, the authors of the German Civil Code (BGB-
Birgerliches Gesetzbuch) rejected the proposal of leading scholars to
create a comprehensive right of personality. 2 5  The legislature
decided that only some specific interests should be protected.
Specifically, a person's rights were protected under the general
provision of the German law of torts and under the right of name.'
In 1907, the legislature created the "right to one's image" (Recht am
eigenen Bd) in sections 22 and 23 of the Act of Artistic Creations
(KUG- Kunsturhebergesetz). 7 In isolated cases, the courts then
extended the "right to one's image" to protect other aspects of an
individual's personality where the defendant acted contra bonos
mores (against good morals).2 8
205. See JORGEN SIMON, DAS ALLGEMEINE PERSONLICHKEITSRECHT UND SEINE
GEWERBLICHEN ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN [THE GENERAL RIGHT OF PERSONALITY AND ITS
COMMERCIAL FORMS] 186 at seq. (1981); SEEMANN, supra note 102, at 120 et seq.; STEFAN
GOTTWALD, DAS ALLGEMEINE PERSONLICHKEITSRECHT [THE GENERAL RIGHT OF
PERSONALITY] 11 (1996).
206. § 12 BGB.
207. Whereas the main part of the provisions of this law has been replaced in the copyright
law reform by the Law on Copyright and Related Protected Rights of 9 September 1965 (UrhG-
Urhebergesetz), these particular provisions expressly remain in force. See §141 Nr. 5 URHG.
Section 22 KUG ("Right to one's image") states:
Pictures or portraits may be distributed or displayed only with the consent of the
person portrayed, i.e., the subject. In cases of doubt, consent is considered to have
been given if the person portrayed has received a consideration for allowing himself
to be portrayed. When the subject dies and for up to 10 years thereafter, the
consent of the next of kin is required. Next of kin within the meaning of this law
are the surviving spouse and children of the subject and, if neither the spouse nor
the children are alive, the parents of the subject.
§ 22 KUG. Section 23 KUG describes the types of pictures that do not require consent:
(1) The following may be distributed or publicly displayed without the required
consent according to § 22:
1. Pictures within the realm of contemporary history;
2. Pictures in which the persons appear only incidentally in a landscape or
other location;
3. Pictures of meetings, receptions, processions and other gatherings in
which the persons portrayed have participated;
4. Pictures that have not been produced by order or request, but whose
distribution or display would be in the higher interests of art.
(2) Consent does not however extend to distribution and display in which the
legitimate interests of the subject or the next of kin are infringed.
§23 KUG.
208. JORGEN HELLE, BESONDERE PERSONLICHKEITSRECHTE IM PRIVATRECHT [SpECIFIC
PERSONALITY RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW] 5; see SIMON, sUpra note 205, at 232-39 (listing a
survey of these cases).
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In 1954, the Federal Supreme Court took the final step in
developing an overall protection of personality by recognizing a
"general right of personality." 2' The Court stated that the "general
right of personality" must be regarded as a constitutionally
guaranteed fundamental right based on Articles 1 and 2 of the
German Constitution of 1949 (GG- Grundgesetz).21 ° Furthermore,
the court declared that this interest is protected under section 823 I
BGB.'" At the time, the concept of the "general right of personality"
was very vague. Today, it still acts as a blanket clause or catch-all"
2
for all misappropriation of identity claims, even though the multitude
of decisions in this field have given this right more shape.2"3
Nevertheless, a general definition of the right has been difficult to
develop and the Constitutional Court has never conclusively defined
it.2 4 Therefore, when determining the scope of the right, courts must
consider the particular circumstances of the individual and his
personal values on a case-by-case basis.2"'
In principle, all natural persons enjoy the "general right of
personality," but it can also protect corporate entities and other
organizations.2"6 Article 19 1I GG states that fundamental rights
shall also apply to domestic legal persons to the extent that such
rights permit.217 In the Carrera case,2"8 the court granted protection
to a limited partnership when the defendant depicted the
209. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Supreme Court] 13,
334 'Leserbriefe,' translated in B.S. MARKESINIS, A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION TO THE
GERMAN LAW OF TORTs 378 (3d ed. 1994).
210. Article 1(1) GG states, "[T]he dignity of a human being is untouchable." Article 2 GG
proclaims the right of the individual to freedom and self-determination. These two articles jointly
create the "general right of personality."
211. The court regarded the 'general right of personality' as 'other right' within the meaning
of § 823 1 BGB. See MARKENSNIS, supra note 209.
212. See KLAUS WASSERBURG, DER SCHUTZ DER PERSONLICHKEIT IM RECHT DER MEDIEN
[THE PROTECTION OF THE PERSONALITY IN MEDIA LAW] 52 (1988).
213. See cases cited in Part Ill.
214. See Gregory J. Thwaite & Wolfgang Brehm, German Privacy and Defaation Law:
The Right to Publish in the Shadow of the Right to Human Dignity, 16 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REVIEW 336, 339(1994).
215. See Bundesverfassungsgericht Neuc Juristische Wochenschrift [BVerfG NJW] 1993,
1463; WASSERBURO, supra note 212, at 53.
216. BundesgerichtshofNeue Juristische Wochenschrift [BGH NJW] 1981, 2402 'Carrera,'
translated in 14 IIC 288, 289 (1983); Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe Gewerblicher Rechtsschulz
und Urheberrecht [OLG GRUR] 1986, 479, 480 'UniversitAtssiegel;' see BundesgerichtshofNeue
Juristische Wochenschrift [BGH NJW] 1994, 1281.
217. See Bundesgerichtshof Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [BGH NJW] 1981, 2402
'Carrera,' translated in 14 IIC 288, 289(1983).
218. BGH NJW 1981, 2402 'Carrera,' translated in 14 IIC 288, 289 (1983).
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partnership's name and racing car on toy racing car packages." 9 The
Federal Supreme Court recognized that the "general right of
personality" is a fundamental right that should also protect legal
entities.' 2 Thus, the right can protect the personality rights of legal
persons within the limits of their intrinsic character and their legally
assigned functions."
Today, the "general right of personality" is a bundle of rights
that protect different aspects of an individual's personality from
unauthorized public exposure. Moreover, it guarantees the
protection of human dignity and the right to freely develop one's
personality. In addition, several aspects of the "general right of
personality" are protected by special statutory provisions.2 n These
statutory rights are the "right to one's image" (sections 22 and 23
KUG) and the "right of name" (section 12 BGB). The "general right
of personality" only applies when these provisions are not
applicable.' 2
B. Right to One's Image
The "right to one's image" grants individuals the exclusive right
to decide to display and distribute their own likeness (Bildnis):"4
"Only the person depicted is, as a holder of the right, entitled to
decide whether, when and how he wishes to present himself to any
third party or the public."' The unauthorized public and private
distribution of the likeness is prohibited. 226 However, section 23
219. Id at 2402.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Bundesgerichtshof Neue Juristische Wochenschrift Rechtsprechungs Report [BGH
NJW-RR] 1987, 231 'Nena,' translated in 19 IIC 271 (1988).
223. The relation between these special personal rights and the 'general right of personality'
is controversial. Whereas the dominant opinion considers these statutory rights only as part of the
general right, some authors treat them as independent rights. WASSERBURG, supra note 212, at
56; HANNs ARNo MAGOLD, PERSONENMERCHANDISING [PERSONALITY MERCHANDISING] 396
(1994).
224. GERHARD SCHRICKER & EKKEHARD GERSTENBERG, URHEBERRECHT [COPYRIGHT
LAW] § 60/ § 22 KUG, no.2 (1987).
225. BGH NJW-RR 1987, 231 'Nena,' translated in IIC 271 (1988).
226. It is important to note that section 22 KUG applies only to the distribution and public
display of pictures and portraits, and not to the production or the reproduction of the picture. See
SCRICKER & GERSTENBERG, supra note 224, § 60/§ 22 KUG, no. 11. The unauthorized
production of the likeness can be an infringement of the "general right of personality." See
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 24, 200 (208) 'Spatheimkehrer,'
Bundesgerichtshof Neue Juristisehe Wochenschrift [BGH NJW] 1966, 2353 "Vor unserer
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kUG provides an exception for the publication of newsworthy
events and likenesses of "persons of contemporary history"
(Personen der Zeitgeschichte).2"
1. Likeness
In Germany, the concept of likeness is broad. The medium of
publication and its form are immaterial; it can be a photograph,
photographic layout, drawing, painting, caricature, sculpture, or
doll. 28 However, determining whether the depicted person is
recognizable is the decisive factor in determining if the use is
actionable under section 22 KUG.229 It is sufficient that a person is
recognizable by clothing, hair-style, or gestures." °  Therefore, a
picture of a person's back or a silhouette can also be a likeness, even
though the face of the person cannot be seen. For example, in the
Fufiballtor case,"1 an advertisement for a television manufacturer
depicted the back of a famous soccer goalkeeper. The Federal
Supreme Court held that the goalkeeper was easily recognizable by
his particular stature, posture, and haircut. It was not necessary that
everyone recognized him, rather it was sufficient that a limited group
of persons knew who was depicted.1 2 In another case, the Federal
Supreme Court in Nacktaufinahme"3 had to decide upon facts similar
to those in the previously discussed Nude Back case.' The picture
in question showed the back of a nude woman which was recognized
by her husband." Like the New York Court of Appeals in the Nude
Back case, the Federal Supreme Court held that the person could be
eigenen Tilr." The reproduction of the picture is protected by copyright law.
227. See infra Part III.B.3.
228. SCHRICKER & GERSTENBERO, supra note 224, § 60/§ 22 KUG, no. 4, 7.
229. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 26, 349 (351)
'Herrenreiter'; WASSERBURG, supra note 212, at 75; HELLE, supra note 208, at 93.
230. SCHRJCKER & GERSTENBERG, supra note 224, §60, no.5 /§22 KUG (giving the
example of Charlie Chaplin being recognizable by his moustache, bowler hat, and walking-stick).
231. Bundesgerichtshof Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [BGH NJW] 1979, 2205
'FuBballtor.'
232. Id. at 2206.
233. BundesgerichtshofNeue Juristische Wochenschrift [BGH NJW] 1974, 1947.
234. Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 482 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1984); see supra Part
II.B.I.
235. BGH NJW 1974, 1947 'Nacktaufnahme.'
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identified and, therefore, should be protected from unauthorized
appropriation, even though facial features could not be seen."
Nevertheless, portraits of look-alikes or doubles do not fall
within the scope of protection under section 22 KUG. Courts
initially considered imitations to be likenesses." However, the
current prevailing opinion grants protection on the basis of the
"general right of personality." 8
Further, if the unauthorized use is parodic, subjects of the
parody can only seek protection of their likenesses if there is danger
of confusion or if the parody amounts to defamation. 9 The Heino
decision2' illustrates the attitude toward parody and persiflage. In
Heino, the lead singer of the punk group, "Tote Hosen" (Dead
Pants), imitated a famous folk-music singer known only by his first
name, "Heino."''  The defendant claimed to be the only "true
Heino" despite the fact that Heino's extremely light blond hair and
dark sunglasses made him easily recognizable to the public.2 2 Heino
sued and sought injunctive relief."3  The Regional Court of
Duisseldorf held that the imitation was not actionable as long as the
public would not mistake the lead singer of the punk group for the
folk singer.' There was no mistake when the defendant performed
on stage that he was the lead singer of a punk group and not a folk
236. Id. at 1949.
237. Kammergericht Juristische Wochenschrift [KG JW] 1928, 363 'Piscator.' See
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 26, 52 (67) 'Sherlock Holmes';
Oberlandesgericht Hamburg Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [OLG Hamburg NJW] 1975, 649
(650) 'Aus nichtigem Anlass.'
238. Andreas Freitag, Die Nachahnnmg bekannter Persanlichkeiten in der Werbung [The
Imitation of Celebrities in Commercials], Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 1994, 345
(346); Joachim Pietzko, Die Werbwig mit dem Doppelganger eines Prommnenten [The
Advertisement with Look-alikes of a Celebrity], Archiv flkr Presserecht [AFP] 1988, 209 (214);
SEEMANN, supra note 102, at 140; KARL EGBERT WENZEL, DAS RECHT DER WORT- UND
BILDBERICHTERSTATTUNG [THE LAW OF REPORTING], HANDBUCH DES AUsSERUNGSRECHTS
[HANDBOOK OF MEDIA LAW] 336 (4th ed. 1994); see SCHRICKER & GERSTENBERG, supra note
224, § 60/§ 22 KUG, no. 10; OTTo-FRIEDRICH VON GAMM, URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ
[COPYRIGIr LAW] Introduction no. 104 (1968); HORST VON HARTLIEB, HANDBUCH DES FILM-,
FERNSEH- UND VIDEORECHTS [HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FILM, TV AND VIDEO] ch. 26 n.16
(3rd. ed. 1991).
239. In case of defamation there is a violation of the "general right of personality." See
SCHRICKER & GERSTENBERG, supra note 224, § 60/§ 22 KUG, no. 7.
240. Oberlandesgericht Dilsseldorf Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [OLG Dasseldorf
NJW] 1987, 1413 'Heino.'
241. Id. at 1413.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1414.
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singer.245 However, advertising posters for the next "Tote Hosen"
concert might create the wrong impression that the folk singer was
now singing in the punk group.2' Based upon this reasoning, the
court ruled that the posters depicted a likeness, as defined in section
22 KUG, and thus enjoined distribution of the posters.247
2. Consent of the Portrayed Person
Lawful distribution and public display of a likeness require
prior consent of the depicted person.' Such consent can be given
expressly or implicitly. Courts establish the extent of the
authorization by interpreting the individual circumstances
surrounding each case.4 9 If there is doubt about whether consent
was given, consent is presumed when the depicted person has
accepted remuneration.25 Nevertheless, where there is commercial
use of a picture, implied consent is difficult to prove because the
depicted person must be aware of the particular purpose for which
the picture will be used." The general consent to publish given by a
celebrity during an interview, for example, does not meet the
heightened standard for implied consent unless the celebrity knows
that the likeness will be used for advertising. In Paul Dahlke, 2 a
photographer took a picture of the actor Paul Dahlke sitting on a
motorcycle and told Dahlke that the picture was intended for a
television program magazine.253 Instead, the picture was sold to the
manufacturer of the motorcycle without Dahlke's permission.' The
picture was used in an advertisement accompanied by the following
text, "Famous man on famous motorcycle." 25 The Federal Supreme
Court carefully examined Dahlke's consent regarding the picture and
the court took into account the circumstances surrounding when the
245. Id.
246. OLG DlsseldorfNJW 1987, 1413 (1414).
247. Id. at 1414.
248. § 22 KUG.
249. Bundesgerichtshof Neuc Juristische Wochenschrift [BGH NJWJ 1979, 2203 (2204)
'Beckenbauer.'
250. § 22 KUG.
251. See BundesgerichtshofNeue Juristische Wochenschrift [BGH NJW] 1956, 1554 'Paul
Dahlke.'
252. BGH NJW 1956, 1554 'Paul Dahlke.'
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1554.
255. Id.
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picture was taken.256 The court concluded that the consent did not
encompass the publication of the advertisement because Dahlke had
no reason to think that the picture would be used commercially.257
In cases of publishing the likeness of a person who has been
deceased for less than ten years, the consent of their next of kin is
required."5 The next of kin are the surviving spouse and children of
the subject, and if neither the spouse nor the children are alive, then
the parents (brothers and sisters are not included) are considered next
of kin.259
3. Picture Within the Realm of Contemporary History
In order to benefit the public, consent is not required if the
likeness is considered to be a picture within the realm of
contemporary history.2' The term "contemporary history " covers
the political, social, economic, sporting, and cultural life of the
nation.2 61 Thus, any person who is linked to newsworthy events or
matters of public interest from the past, present, or future is regarded
as a "person of contemporary history" (Person der Zeitgeschichte)"2
and must tolerate distribution of their likeness.
There are two categories of persons-absolute public persons
and relative public persons (absolute und relative Personen der
Zeitgeschichte). Absolute public persons include those permanently
bound to contemporary history, such as politicians, members of a
royal family, 3 actors,' singers,265 talk show hosts,' and athletes.'
256. Id. at 1554-55.
257. BGH NJW 1956, 1554 'Paul Dahlke.' Likewise, the consent of a hiker to have his
photograph taken during a hiking tour does not include the consent to be depicted in a travel
brochure. See Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 1986,
614.
258. § 22 KUG.
259. Id.
260. § 23 KUG.
261. SCHMiCKER & GERSTENBERG, supra note 224, § 23 KUG/§ 60, no. 8.
262. SCHRICKER & GERSTENBERG, supra note 224, § 23 KUG/§ 60, no. 9.
263. Karnmergericht Juristische Wochenschrift [KG JW] 1929, 363 'Piscator';
BundesgerichtshofNeue Juristische Wochenschrift [BGH NJW] 1996, 1128 (1129) 'Caroline von
Monaco.' But see Bundesgerichtshof Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [BGH NJW] 1996, 985
(986). The Federal Supreme Court did not consider the son of Caroline of Monaco as a "persons
of contemporary history" arguing that children of "persons of contemporary history" do not fall
within that category unless they fulfill the duties of their parents.
264. Bundesgerichtshof Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [BGH NJW] 1992, 2084
'Fuchsberger.'
265. BGH NJW-RR 1987, 231 'Nena'; Kammergericht Archiv fbr Urheber-, Film, Funk-
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Conversely, relative public persons are those linked only to a specific
event. For example, parties involved in an important trial, or
participants in a game or talk show would be considered relative
public persons." The likeness of a relative public person can only
be published if it has both an actual and recognizable connection to a
specific event.269
Event coverage is not considered newsworthy unless the display
of the likeness satisfies the public's interest in the information.27
Advertising27' and merchandising2" are generally considered
commercial interests with public information being of secondary
importance. Therefore, advertising and merchandising are generally
not considered newsworthy. For example, if a person's picture is
used solely to draw the public's attention to a product, German
courts generally will not find the use to be in the public's interest. It
is irrelevant that the product is of high quality and that the picture
itself is unobjectionable.2"
The following examples illustrate factors the German courts
take into consideration when balancing public interest and
information with commercial interests. In the Ligaspieler
decision,274 the defendant sold portraits of soccer players on trading
cards in sealed packages. The Federal Supreme Court denied the
applicability of section 23 KUG, noting that the purpose of
conveying the information ("Zweck der Informationsvermittlung")
was secondary.275 The principal objective was to incite young buyers
to collect these pictures and buy more of the product in order to get
und Theaterrecht [KG UFITA] 1981, 163 (164) 'Udo Lindenberg.'
266. Landgericht K6ln Archiv for Presserecht 1994, 165.
267. Bundesgerichtshof Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [BGH NJW] [Supreme Court]
1968, 1091 'Ligaspieler'; BGH NJW 1979, 2203 'Beckenbauer'; Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt
Zeitschrift fur Urheber- und Medienrecht [OLG Frankfurt ZUM] 1988, 248 'Boris Becker.'
268. VON HARTLIEB, supra note 238 at ch. 26 n.3.
269. Bundesgerichtshof Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [BGH NJW] 1965, 2148
'Spielgeflfhrtin' [Playmate].
270. Id
271. Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 74, 308 (312) 'Graf
Zeppelin'; BGH NJW 1992, 2084 'Fuchsberger'; Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift [OLG Frankfurt NJW] 1966, 254 'Engel in der Leitung.'
272. ScmucKER & GERSTENBERO, supra note 224, § 60/23 KUG, no. 38.
273. BGH NJW 1956, 1554 'Paul Dahlke.'
274. BGH NJW 1968, 1091 'Ligaspieler.'
275. Id. at 1092.
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the full collection.276 Accordingly, the court held that the soccer
players had a legitimate interest in controlling their commercial
exposure and should have the right to benefit from their own
popularity.27 In contrast to Ligaspieler, the Beckenbauer decision2
involved the use of a picture of the well-known soccer player, Franz
Beckenbauer, on the front page of a soccer calendar. The Federal
Supreme Court found that although the publisher might have a
commercial interest, it was outweighed by the public's interest in the
information.279 To determine the main purpose of the photograph,
the court considered the circumstances surrounding the publication.
The court took into account that Beckenbauer was the most famous
soccer player at that time, the publication took place shortly after a
big soccer event, and the picture was not a portrait, but showed
Beckenbauer among other players.28
The Regional Court of Appeals of Frankfurt came to a similar
conclusion when it considered whether the publication of a picture of
Boris Becker on the cover page of a tennis book was lawful.2 ' The
court found that while the publication of Becker's likeness partly
served the commercial interest of the publisher, the interest of the
public in the information was prevailing, and Becker's claim was
therefore dismissed.2"2 The court took into consideration that Becker
was an absolute public person of contemporary history-the picture
showed him in action during a typical match situation, and the
picture was necessary to illustrate the topic, concept, and content of
the book.28 3  Similarly, in two decisions, Chris Revue2" and
Abschiedsmedaille,285 the Federal Supreme Court ruled against
protecting a celebrity's right to likeness. In Chris Revue, a famous
actor was depicted on the cover page of an advertising brochure for a
drugstore chain. 6 A short article on the actor appeared inside the
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. BGH NJW 1979, 2203 'Beckenbauer.'
279. Id. at 2204.
280. Id. at 2203.
281. OLG Frankfurt ZUM 1988, 248 'Boris Becker.'
282. Id. at 249.
283. Id.
284. BundesgerichtshofWettbewcrb In Recht und Praxis [BGH WRP] 1995,613.
285. Bundesgerichtshof Neue Juristische Wochcnschrift [BGH NJW] 1996, 593
'Abschiedsmedaille.'
286. BGH WRP 1995, 613.
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brochure.2"7 The court stated that freedom of the press outweighs the
interest of the individual as long as the reader does not assume that
the celebrity endorses the product.288 Abschiedsmedaille involved the
deceased chancellor Willy Brandt's head embossed on one side of a
medal and some historic data of his life on the other side.289 Because
Brandt's likeness was shown in close connection with his
achievements as a politician and statesman, the court found that the
informational character of the medal was predominant and did not
find Brandt's rights were infringed.' °
C. Right of Name
The right of name is governed by section 12 BGB.29 This right
protects a person from the unauthorized use of his name.2" The two
critical issues in a right of name dispute are whether the name is
protected and whether use of the name was lawful.
Under the statute, names that identify a person are protected.
Therefore, a first name or a pseudonym is protected if it is so closely
related to one person that the general public would think of that
person when hearing the name.? This was the case with the famous
German actress, Romy Schneider, who was known as "Romy." The
name was used as a title for a movie that had no connection to the
actress. The Court of Appeals of Munich held in favor of Schneider,
stating that simply mentioning the name "Romy" would evoke
memories of the actress in the general public.2'
287. Id. at 613.
288. Id. at 614.
289. BGH NJW 1996, 593 'Abschiedsmedaille.'
290. Id. at 595.
291. § 12 BGB states:
If the right to the use of a name by a person entitled to it is challenged by another,
or if the interest of the person entitled is injured by the fact that another uses the
same name without authority, then the person entitled may demand from the other
elimination of the infringement. If further infringements are anticipated, he may
seek an injunction.
§12 BGB. The protection of§ 12 BGB also extends to trade names. This provision is construed
very broadly and in practice, has become a general means of protection for the whole law of
names -and business designations. See Michael Lehmann, Unfair Use of and Damage to the
Reputation of Well-Known Marks Names and Indications of Source mi Germany: Some Aspects
of Law and Economics, 17 IIC 746, 747 (1986).
292. Id.
293. Bundesgerichtshof Neue Juristische Wochenschrifl [BGH NJWJ [Supreme Court]
1983,1184 (1185) 'Uwe.'
294. Oberlandesgerichte Mfilnchen Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [OLG
Mfnchen GRUR] 1960, 394 'Romy.'
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Section 12 BGB prohibits the appropriation of a name.
Likelihood of confusion is the decisive factor for determining
whether there is an illicit use of a name within the meaning of this
provision.295 Whether confusion is likely depends not only on the
distinctiveness of the name, but also on the field in which the holder
of the name enjoys their particular reputation.2 In Romy, the court
explicitly limited the protection of the actress's name to the film
industry.297 For example, the use of the name "Romy" for shoes
would be permissible. Misappropriation of a name is also found
when mentioning the name creates the impression that a special
relationship exists between the holder of the name and the user. In
these circumstances, the public is led to believe that the holder has
consented to the use of their name and personally endorses the
product.29
The public use of a person's name is lawful as long as there is
no defamation or appropriation. An example of this distinction is
found in the Catarina Valente decision.299 A manufacturer of denture
fixtures, Kukident, used the name of Catarina Valente, a famous
actress, in an advertisement with the following text: "Even though I
did not become as famous as my great colleague Catarina Valente, I
loved the theatre. One day something awful happened. While I was
singing my favorite song, I suddenly lost my teeth. This
performance was a horrible humiliation which destroyed my
career." 300 The Federal Supreme Court emphasized that merely
mentioning the name was not a violation of section 12 BGB because
there was no appropriation of the name within the meaning of this
301provision. However, the court afforded protection on other
grounds. It found that the advertisement amounted to defamation
and was therefore a violation of the "general right of personality.
' 31
295. PALANDT & HEINRICHS, KOMIENTAR ZUM BGB [COMMENTARY TO THE BGB] § 12,
no. 20 (56th ed. 1997).
296. Christof Krflger, Right of Privacy, Right of Personality and Conmierdal Advertising,
13 TIC 183, 197 (1983).
297. OLG Manchen GRUR 1960, 394.
298. Bundesgerichtshof Neue Juristische Wochenschrift Rechtsprechungs Report [BGH
NJW- RR] 1989, 1388.
299. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Supreme Court] 30, 7
'Catarina Valente.'
300. Id. at 8.
301. Id. at9.
302. Id. at 13.
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Applying this ruling to the Michael Jackson example 3 would
result in Michael Jackson not having a valid claim under German
law. There, the advertisement did not imply that there was a special
relationship between the performer and Coca-Cola, and therefore, a
German court would not find a section 12 BGB violation. Moreover,
unlike the "Catarina Valente" advertisement, the use of Michael
Jackson's name was not defamatory.
D. Other Aspects ofPersonality
While the protection of name and likeness is subject to statutory
provisions, other aspects of the personality fall within the broader
"general right of personality." In the Heinz Erhardt case,3"4 the son
of the famous deceased actor and author, Heinz Erhardt, sought to
enjoin a radio advertisement. In the advertisement, an imitator
impersonated the actor's voice and made use of terms which were
generally recognized as idiosyncrasies unmistakably associated with
the deceased Erhardt. 5 The Court of Appeals of Hamburg drew a
parallel to protect name and likeness and extended it to protect voice
against imitation:
The severity of the infringement of the personality right in this
case is no less than in a case of appropriation of a likeness or
name. The living memory of Erhardt's artistic personality is
evoked for each person who listens to the radio advertisement,
regardless of whether or not the imitation is detected. This is the
intended effect, for the advertisement draws its commercial
value precisely from its provocative and striking effect. 3°
The court, in granting injunctive relief, held that an artist who usually
receives remuneration for the unauthorized use of his personality does not
have to tolerate imitation.307
E. Transferability of the "General Right of Personality"
In the U.S., the right of publicity is a freely transferable
property right, independent of the non-transferable right of
303. See supra Part II.B.2.
304. Oberlandesgericht Hamburg Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [OLG
Hamburg GRUR] 1989, 666, translated in 21 IIC 881.
305. For questions regarding descendibility, see infra Part III.F.
306. OLG Hamburg GRUR 1989, 666.
307. Id. at 666.
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privacy.308 However, the German "general right of personality" has
always been considered a personal right,3" and therefore, transfer of
ownership is not permissible.3"0
Nevertheless, the "right to one's image" 31 2 is currently assumed
to have some commercially exploitable value. This assumption is
based on the fact that a person has the ability to consent in advance
to the use of his personality in exchange for a fee.313 In practice, this
allows the person to grant licenses to others. 4 However, it is still
unclear what effects such licenses have and which rights can vest in a
licensee.
In Nena, the Federal Supreme Court made it clear that the
licensee has standing to sue for monetary damages. arising out of
licensing infringements.3 5 Nena, a famous German pop singer,
assigned all of her commercially exploitable rights, including the
right to her image, to the plaintiff, a collecting society.36 The
defendant sold items such as photographs, T-shirts, stationery and
photo toothbrushes bearing Nena's likeness without the consent of
the collecting society.317 The collecting society claimed to have the
exclusive rights to exploit Nena's likeness and sued for
compensation. 3 '8 The Federal Supreme Court held in favor of the
plaintiff stating:
At issue here is not the right to an injunction order but the right
to recover a fee which plaintiff demands for the commercial
exploitation of Nena's likeness. The decision whether to award
308. See supra Part II.D-E.
309. See DAScH, DIE EINWILLIGUNG ZUM EINGRIFF IN DAS RECHT AM EIGENEN BILD
[CONSENT TO THE INTERFERENCE WITH THE RIGHT TO ONE'S IMAGE] 35 (1990).
310. HELLE, supra note 208, at 52; DASc-, supra note 309, at 35.
311. See supra Part III.B.1.
312. See BGH GRUR 1956,427 'Paul Dahlke' (regarding the right to one's image).
313. ANDREAS FREITAG, DIE KOMMERZiALISIERUNG VON DARBIETUNG UND
PERSONLICHKEIT DES AUSOBENDEN KI)NSTLERS [THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE
PERFORMANCE AND PERSONALITY OF THE PERFORMING ARTIST] 162 (1993); GOTTING,
PERs0NLICHKEITSRECHTE ALS VERMOGENSRECHTE 142; SEEMANN supra note 102, at 165; see
Iirgen Ernst-Moll, Das Recht am eigenen Bildnis - vor und vor allem nach dem Tode [THE
RIGHT TO ONE'S IMAGE BEFORE AND AFTER DEATH] Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz Und
Urhgberrecht 1996, 558 (562).
.314. G6tting, supra note 102, at 142.
315. Bundesgerichtshof Neue Juristische Wochenschrift Rechtsprechungs-Report [BGH
NJW-RR] 1987,231 'Nena.'
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
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this recovery does not require a decision on the controversial
question of whether or not the "right to one's image," due to its
legal nature as a general personality right, is transferable. The
defendant's use of Nena's likeness gave rise to the plaintiff's
right to recover the usual fee for permission to utilize the
likeness which is based on section 812 BGB, and does not
require that Nena's right in her own likeness had been
transferred to the plaintiff.31 9
The ruling in Nena has considerably bolstered the rights of
licensees by allowing them to recover for monetary damage.
However, it is still unclear whether third persons may seek injunctive
relief or whether only the exploited person has the right to prohibit
others from using his identity.
F Descendibility of the "General Right of Personality"
Just as German law prohibits the transfer of ownership of the
"general right of personality," the right is also not descendible"
Consequently, a testator cannot make it a part of his estate. 2' But as
seen in the Erhardt case, section 22 KUG vests limited protection of
the decedent's likeness in his next of kin."2 Consent of the next of
kin is required for a period of ten years. 3 During that period, the
next of kin have the authority to demand licensing fees and monetary
compensation for publication. 24 Thus, even though this right is not
inheritable, certain heirs still have the right to market the decedent's
likeness. It is important to note that only the surviving wife and
children of the person pictured can exercise these rights under the
statute.3= If the person pictured has no surviving wife or child, the
parents of the person can exercise these rights.3
As far as the other aspects of personality were concerned, the
state of the law is not clear. Due to the absence of any specific
statutory provision, it was again the task of the Federal Supreme
Court to develop rules. The Federal Supreme Court has repeatedly
319. Id. at 231-32.
320. VON GAMM, supra note 238, at introduction no. 109; PALANDT & HEINRICHS, supra
note 295, § 1922 no. 43; SEEMANN, supra note 102, at 168.
321. See SEEMANN, supra note 102, at 168.
322. See supra Part III.B.2.
323. § 22 KUG.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
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stated that the legal protection of personality accorded by Article 1
GG does not end at death. 27 The general right to dignity and
integrity survives, so that the image of the deceased continues to be
protected, at least from gross injuries to his honor and reputation.32
This right to protection can be claimed by the decedent's next of kin
within the meaning of section 22 KUG.3"
In Heinz Erhardt,330 the court stated that the protection of the
"general right of personality" encompasses all continuing use of the
artist's work.3 ' The court emphasized that life image and life work
can hardly be separated from one another in the case of an artist's
personality.332 As a starting point for measuring the scope of
protection extending beyond death, the court looked at the extent of
the artist's right during his lifetime.333 In this case, Heinz Erhardt
would have been protected during his life against the commercial use
of an imitation of his voice." The court explicitly considered the
protection of likeness in section 22 KUG, and held that the
underlying principles are similar whether it is use of likeness, name,
or voice.3 It would be unacceptable, in light of the German
Constitution, if the personality of the artist could be freely imitated
immediately after his death.33 This is true regardless of whether the
imitation compromises the dignity and integrity of a person or their
heir's right of exploitation.337 The ruling in Heinz Erhardt is
significant because the court gave all aspects of personality the same
scope of protection after death. Even though the decision only
involved injunctive relief, it can also be seen as an extension of the
next of kin's right to market the decedent's life image. Thus, the
next of kin are in a position to give their consent and waive their
right to seek an injunction in exchange for a license fee.
327. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Supreme Court] 50,
133 (137) 'Mephisto'; Bundesgerichtshof Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis [BGH WRP] 1984,
681 'Frischzellen-Kosmetik,' translated in 17 IIC 426 (1986).
328. BGH WRP 1984, 681 (682).
329. Ernst-Moll, supra note 313, at 563; see also Getting, supra note 102, GRUR Int. 1995,
656, 669; SEEMANN, supra note 102, at 168 (discussing the descendibility of the "general right of
personality").
330. OLG Hamburg GRUR 1989,666.
331. Id.
332. Id
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. OLG Hamburg GRUR 1989, 666.
337. Id.
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Whether there is a ten year limit on rights outside of section 22
KUG has yet to be resolved. The Heinz Erhardt court did not rule on
a time limit issue because the ten year period had not expired at the
time of the decision. In Emil Nolde,338 the Federal Supreme Court
gave some indication of how long such protection could last.339
Nolde involved two pictures bearing forged signatures of Emil
Nolde, the German expressionist." The Federal Supreme Court
found that the pictures imitated the style and motifs of Emil Nolde.34
This, together with the forged signatures, violated his "general right
of personality."342  The Court held the duration of posthumous
personal protection depends on the circumstances of each case, and
above all, on the renown and significance of the individual's
personality. 3 The Court found that protection would not lapse for
Emil Nolde until thirty years after his death because of his
reputation.3" Because the infringement in this case occurred
approximately thirty years after the painter's death, the Court did not
have to rule on whether a longer period of protection would be
permissible. This decision shows that posthumous protection can,
depending on the circumstances, endure at least as long as thirty
years.345 As long as this protection lasts, the heirs can waive their
right to protection and allow commercial use.'
G. Remedies
A celebrity whose "general right of personality" has been
violated can seek either injunctive relief or monetary
compensation.347 When monetary compensation is sought, the courts
draw a sharp distinction between cases where the person has been
338. Bundesgerichtshof Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [BGH GRUR] 1995,
668.
339. Id. at 671.
340. Id. at 668.
341. Id. at 670.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. BGH GRUR 1995, 668.
345. G6tting, supra note 102; GRUR Int. 1995, 656 (669) (suggesting a protection of 70
years post mortem); see Heimo Schack, Das Personlichkeitsrecht der Urheber und der
auszibenden Kfinstler nach dem Tode [THE RIGHT OF PERSONALITY OF THE CREATORS AND THE
PERFORMING ARTISTS AFTER DEATH], GRUR 1985, 352 (359).
346. See CHRISTIAN SCHERTZ, MERCHANDISING 161 (1997); Ernst-Moll, supra note 313, at
565-66.
347. This claim would be based on § 1004 BGB.
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defamed and cases not involving damage to reputation. Defamation
in an advertisement, being a severe infringement of the "general right
of personality," gives rise to compensation for pain and suffering as
well as for economic loss"8
In cases where the likeness, name, or another aspect of the
personality has been exploited in commercials without any
defamation, plaintiffs can recover for economic loss if they can
prove that they lost profits due to an unauthorized use. Alternatively,
a court may grant a "fictitious license fee."349 Similar to copyright
infringement cases, 350 courts grant compensation in the amount
which would have been paid by the infringing party if it had, in good
faith, negotiated a license in advance. Courts derive this remedy
from section 812 BGB, which is based on principles of unjust
enrichment.3 52  A defendant has to relinquish any financial gain he
has enjoyed at the celebrity's expense, which is equal to the fee a
plaintiff could have reasonably demanded from the defendant for the
use of the likeness or name. 3  Courts reason that defendants should
not stand in a better position than if they asked for the plaintiff's
consent.3' This right of recovery exists regardless of whether a
plaintiff would have permitted the use of their name.355
It is important to note that courts will not grant both monetary
damages and fictitious license fees.356  The underlying rationale is
that if a plaintiff is awarded a fictitious license fee, the plaintiff will
be considered to have closed a licensing or merchandising contract
with the tortfeasor. 57 Because consent is granted ex post facto, the
plaintiff would not be entitled to monetary damages.358
348. See BGHZ 26, 349 (358-59).
349. See, e.g., BGH NJW 1956, 1554 (1555) 'Paul Dahlke'; BGH GRUR 1979, 732 (734)
'FuBballtor'; BGH NJW 1981, 2402 (2403) 'Carrera'; BGH NJW-RR 1987, 231 (232); BGH
NJW 1992, 2084 (2085) 'Fuchsberger.'
350. Bundesgerichtshof Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [BGH GRUR] 1987,
37 (39) 'Videolizenzvertrag'; BGH 1991 IIC 423.
351. See, e.g., BGH NJW 1956, 1554 (1555) 'Paul Dahlke'; BGH GRUR 1979, 732 (734)
'FuBballtor'; BGH NJW 1981, 2402 (2403) 'Carrera'; BGH NJW-RR 1987, 231 (232); BGH
NJW 1992, 2084 (2085) 'Fuchsberger.'
352. BGH NJW 1981, 2402 'Carrera.'
353. Id. at 2402; see BGH NJW 1992, 2084 (2085).
354. BGH NJW 1956, 1554 (1555) 'Paul Dahlke'; BGH GRUR 1979, 732 (734)
'FuBballtor'; BGH NJW 1981, 2402 (2403) 'Carrera'; WASSERBURG, supra note 212, at 228.
355. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 1926, 349 (352).
356. Krager, supra note 296, at 186.
357. Id.
358. Id.
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In order to determine the amount of the fictitious license fee, the
court will only consider expert opinions if it is not familiar with the
prices actually paid in the respective area."' The damages for
defamation and fictitious license fees are usually very low and often
do not reflect their true value.3" This is a typical characteristic of
civil damages in Germany, which are generally far less than those in
the U.S. For example, the goalkeeper shown from the back in
Fussballtor received 3,050 DM (approximately 1,700 U.S.
dollars).36' Also, in the case where Nena's likeness had been used
commercially on T-shirts and other items, the collecting society to
which Nena had assigned all her commercially exploitable rights,
received only 5,500 DM (approximately 3,055 U.S. dollars).362
Moreover, punitive damages are not available in Germany.
IV. COMPARSON
The American right of publicity and the German "general right
of personality" share some common features and provide a similar
scope of protection of a person's identity, even though they are
conceptually different. In both Germany and the U.S., likeness is
defined broadly. Both court systems, while taking the surrounding
circumstances into account, emphasize identification of the person as
the decisive factor for protection." In both countries, celebrities
enjoy protection against imitation by look-alikes or sound-alikes if
the imitation creates the impression that the real celebrity endorses
the particular product.3 4 A comparison of the holdings in Heinz
Erhardt6 5 and Midler3 or Waits 7 demonstrates this similarity. In
these cases the courts granted protection where the distinctive voice
of an artist was widely known and was deliberately imitated in order
to attract attention to a product.368 The German and U.S. courts
would probably reach different decisions in a case where the
359. WASSERBURG, supra note 212, at 228.
360. See, e.g., BGH GRUR 1979, 732 (734) 'FuBballtor'; BGH NJW-RR 1987, 231 (232)
'Nena.'
361. BGH GRUR 1979, 732 (734) 'FuBballtor.'
362. BGH NJW-RR 1987, 231 (232) 'Nena.'
363. See supra Parts II.B, HI.C.
364. Id
365. OLG Hamburg GRUR 1989, 666.
366. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
367. Apple Corps Ltd. V. Adriondack Group, 476 N.Y.2d 716, 718-19 (1983).
368. See supra Parts II.B.3, III.D.
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prohibited use of a person's name is involved, and the name merely
draws attention to the product without implying false endorsement.
While the American courts would likely grant protection to the
celebrity based on the celebrity's right of publicity,369 German courts,
under the Catarina Valente decision,37 would deny any protection
unless the advertisement was defamatory. 7'
Similarities between the two systems are apparent when the
courts have to determine whether publication of a person's likeness
is newsworthy. In balancing the public's interest in information with
an individual's right to protection from exploitation, both systems
consider similar criteria. In both Germany and the U.S., the
depiction of athletes on trading cards is not permissible without
consent.37 In cases such as these, the prevailing commercial
interests are too overriding to allow a newsworthiness defense.
However, in Montana,' as in Beckenbauer74 or Becker, 375 the
courts dismissed the athlete's claim and held that the distributions of
the likenesses were newsworthy given the content of the pictures as
well as the timing of their publication.3 76 All pictures in these cases
depicted game action., They were not mere portraits of the athletes
and were published shortly after newsworthy events.
3
The courts may differ when an advertisement involves a parody
of a celebrity. The parody defense has been rejected in White, 31
while the Heino case shows that German courts are less reluctant to
permit the defense. 379 The court pointed out that the imitation of
Heino was legitimate as long as it was recognizable as a "spoof.1380
Only if a consumer might think that the picture depicted the original
Heino would there be a violation of the "right to one's image., 381 In
369. See supra Part II.
370. BGHNJW 1981, 2402.
371. Id.
372. See supra Parts II.B. 1, III.B. 1-2.
373. Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
374. BGH NJW 1979, 2203.
375. OLG Frankfurt ZUM 1988, 248.
376. See supra Parts II.C.2, III.B.3.
377. Id.
378. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g deniec4 989
F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1992).
379. OLG DtlsseldorfNJW 1987, 1413.
380. Id. at 1414.
381. Id.
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White, no consumer would have realistically believed Vanna White
endorsed the product." 2
The major difference between the right of publicity and the
"general right of personality" is that the former is a property right,3"3
while the latter is a personal right.3" This distinction makes a
difference in the transferability and descendibility of the rights. In
Germany, ownership is not transferable or descendible.385 However,
the fact that the person may consent to the publication in exchange
for a fee allows the celebrity to license aspects of his or her identity
and, consequently, makes the right of personality marketable.386
Therefore, descendants can control the decedent's image and its
commercial use.387
The protection a licensee enjoys in Germany is a limited one.
Although a licensee can seek monetary damages for infringement,
the licensee does not have standing to enjoin third parties from the
use of the licensor's identity, even in the case of an exclusive
license.388 Injunctive relief is reserved solely for the celebrity.38 9
As far as monetary compensation is concerned, the outcome of
a lawsuit might differ widely even if courts in both countries grant
protection. In Germany, compensatory damages are rather low in
comparison to what American courts grant."9 Moreover, punitive
damages do not exist in Germany.39" '
The German courts' recent decisions show that courts
increasingly recognize that aspects of personality may have some
commercial value, and are to some extent marketable.39 Step by
step, the "right to one's image" has moved away from the law of
defamation, which does not refer to any commercial aspects, and is
382. White, 971 F.2d 1395.
383. See supra Part I.
384. See supra Part III.E.
385. See supra Parts III.E-F.
386. Id
387. See supra Part H.F.
388. See supra Part III.G.
389. See upra Part I1I.E.
390. See supra Part lII.G.
391. Id.
392. See Walter Leisner, Von der persOnlichen Freiheit zum Personlichkensrecht [From
Personal Liberty to the Right of Personality], BEITRAGE ZUM SCHUTZ DER PERSONLICHKEIT
UND IHRER SCHOPFERISCHEN LEISTUNGEN, FESTSCHRIFT FOR HEINRICH HUBmANN
[CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PROTECTION OF THE PERSONALITY AND ITS CREATIVE
PERFORMANCES] 295, 304 (1985).
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turning into a commercially exploitable right." The ability to
consent through licenses and the award of fictitious license fees by
the courts demonstrate such a development.3" Thus, German law
has moved towards the American approach.39
There remain major conceptual differences between the legal
nature of the two rights. The German courts still approach the
"general right of personality" as a traditional, non-commercial right.
German courts do not draw the distinction between a right of
privacy, not suitable for commercial exploitation, and a right of
publicity, which allows one to control his commercial use. The
primary purpose of the German "general right of personality" is not
to protect property and commercial values, but to guarantee human
dignity and the right of free development of the personality."
The fact that the "general right of personality" is non-
transferable limits the possibilities of celebrities to exploit their
identities commercially. In the first place, courts are reluctant to
award high monetary damages.3" Moreover, licensees cannot
prevent others from unauthorized use.39 The fact that the right is not
descendible also influences the value of the right.3" As the court in
Martin Luther King, Jr.' noted, the descendibility of the right of
publicity enhances the right's value during the celebrity's lifetime
and allows the celebrity to profit." In Germany, only the next of kin
can consent to use after the celebrity's death.' Thus, any licensees
are prevented from using the celebrity's image after death.' °3 Such
restriction makes the transferred right less valuable for the licensee,
and consequently for the celebrity during his or her lifetime.
393. See supra Parts III.A, III.E-F.
394. See supra Parts IV.E-F.
395. See supra Part II.A.
396. See Art. 1-2 GG.
397. See supra Part III.G.
398. See Part III.E.
399. See supra Part III.F.
400. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc.,
296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982); see supra Part I.E.
401. See id.
402. See supra Part III.F.
403. See supra Part III.E.
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V. CONCLUSION
In summary, the German courts have not recognized the
"general right of personality" as a property right, and probably will
not do so in the near future. The "general right of personality" does
not protect against unauthorized use of personality so that celebrities
can profit. It is merely a remedy to prevent the dissemination of a
likeness or an advertising campaign, for example, rather than to
provide compensation.
The question of which approach is preferable depends largely
on the value one puts on the celebrities' rights over the public
interest. It is surely equitable to give celebrities the ability to prevent
dissemination of their likenesses or to participate in the gain. This is
especially true if the advertisement is of no informational or other
social value. The solution the German courts have reached appears
to grant the celebrities enough protection. In cases like White, it
could be argued that the American courts sometimes overextend
protection. The compromise the German courts have found seems to
be reasonable. When there is no danger of confusion, there is no
reason to inhibit such socially enriching activities as parody. After
all, one of the underlying rationales of the right of publicity is to
further such activities.
